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ANOMALY OR TIPPING POINT?
Arthur S. Leonard*

Introduction
During 2010, a series of decisions by United States District Court judges'
appeared to mark a significant breakthrough in the ongoing struggle by sexual
minorities in the United States to achieve legal equality through the removal of
objectionable laws and policies. Almost as if a dam had broken, there was a
sudden rush of developments on three highly contested fronts: (1) the
statutory ban on military service by openly gay individuals, (2) the exclusion
from federal recognition for lawfully contracted same-sex marriages, and (3) a
popularly enacted California state constitutional amendment taking away
same-sex marriage rights that had previously been granted by a state supreme
court decision. In each of these cases, the district courts declared the contested
policy to be unconstitutional and ordered injunctive relief, placing in doubt the
willingness of courts to continue crediting traditional arguments that had been
successfully invoked by the government when defending these and similar
policies in past cases.
Trial judges' decision are not final if the government seeks to appeal, and all of
these trial court decisions were appealed, so the string of trial court victories
during 2010 might be ephemeral anomalies. But the judges' written opinions,
lengthy and detailed and carefully reasoned so as to pose a significant
challenge to the appellants, seemed very firmly based on extensive factual
findings and likely to survive review, suggesting that a tipping point, a moment
of decisive change on sexual minority issues, may have been reached in the U.S.
federal courts. Additionally, some of the opinions seem to have had a
persuasive effect on the other branches of the federal government, as the
Congress and the Executive Branch moved later in the year to provisionally
repeal the military policy 2 and the Executive signalled on February 23, 2011,
*Professor, New York Law School. B.S., Cornell University 1974; J.D., Harvard University 1977.
Editor, Lesbian/Gay Law Notes.
1 Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Mass., July 8, 2011);
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 698
F.Supp.2d 234 (D.Mass., July 8, 2010) (both holding unconstitutional Section 3 of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D.Cal., Aug.
3, 2010) (holding unconstitutional a California state constitutional amendment enacted by
Proposition 8 of 2008 which provided that only different-sex marriages would be valid or
recognized in California); Log Cabin Republicans v. United States of America, 716 F.Supp.2d 884
(C.D.Cal., Sept. 9, 2010); Witt v. U.S. Department of the Air Force, 2010 Westlaw 3732189
(W.D.Wash., Sept. 24, 2010) (holding unconstitutional the federal policy on military service by
gay people (LCR) and ordering reinstatement of a lesbian who had been discharged under the
policy (Witt)).
2 Don'tAsk Don't Tell RepealAct of 2010, enacted
December 22, 2010.
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that it no longer believed that the federal non-recognition policy was
constitutional, based on a doctrinal analysis that had potentially far-reaching
consequences for future gay rights claims. 3 As a practical consequence of this
Executive announcement, the chances that two of these rulings would be
reversed on appeal appeared significantly diminished.4
In this comment, I argue that these decisions may work a fundamental change
in the analysis of LGBT constitutional claims that portends significant progress
towards achieving legal equality for sexual minorities in the United States.
I. The Underlying Doctrinal Issues.
Each of the contested policies was challenged by invoking constitutional
doctrines of due process of law and/or equal protection of the law found in the
5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. The 5 th
Amendment, adopted as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791, forbids the federal
government from depriving anyone of life, liberty or property "without due
process of law." The 14 th Amendment, adopted after the American Civil War
(1861-65), similarly forbids the states from depriving "any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law," and further provides that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." The Supreme Court has ruled that the concept of equal protection of the
laws is so integral to the guarantee of due process that the 5th Amendment
should also be construed to incorporate an equal protection requirement as a
restraint on the action of the federal government. Thus, at the heart of
constitutional protection for individual rights are the requirements of due
process and equal protection.
Further, the Supreme Court has ruled, controversially to some, that the
guarantee of due process is not merely procedural but also incorporates a
substantive component such that laws abridging rights of life, liberty or
property must always at least meet the test that a rational lawmaker could
have believed, when enacting the measure, that it would actually advance a
legitimate, non-discriminatory governmental interest. The Supreme Court has
gone further to hold that when a government policy abridges a right that the
Supreme Court has identified as fundamental, the trial court should presume
that the policy violates the due process guarantee unless the government
meets the burden to show that the policy is actually necessary to achieve a
'compelling' interest of the state.
The Supreme Court has adopted a similar method of analyzing equal protection
claims. Recognizing that most government policies may be seen to have
unequal effects or to bestow unequal benefits, the Court has ruled that
3 U.S. Department of Justice, February 23, 2011 [Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr.,
to Speaker of the House of Representatives John Boehner, explaining the Administration's
position, available on the website of the U.S. Department of Justice].
4 The Justice Department informed the 1st Circuit, pursuant to the Department's
announcement, that it would not substantively defend the non-recognition policy, embodied in
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, in the pending appeals.
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ordinarily a policy that was enacted or adopted through procedurally regular
means will be presumed constitutional unless a challenger can show that
rational lawmakers could not have believed that the policy was calculated to
achieve a legitimate, non-discriminatory governmental purpose. As in the case
of due process challenges, a policy that creates inequality concerning a
'fundamental right' will be presumed unconstitutional, throwing the burden on
the government to show that the policy is necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental interest and that it imposes no more inequality than is required
to achieve that interest, and mere hypotheses about what legislators could
have believed at the time of enactment will not suffice to save such a law.
Furthermore, the Court has ruled that the presumption of unconstitutionality
should also apply when the government has adopted a policy that discriminates
on some basis that should be treated as 'suspect' because either history or the
nature of the classification at issue would naturally give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that illegitimate motives - prejudice, bigotry, stereotypes - had

infected the lawmaking process. Over the past half century, the Supreme Court
has developed a complicated jurisprudence of equal protection under which
various personal characteristics have been identified as grounds upon which to
impose the presumption of unconstitutionality and to place a burden of
justification on the government. In light of the history leading to the enactment
of the 14th Amendment, it was inevitable that race and colour would be the
paradigmatic suspect classifications. When the government uses such a
classification in a law or decision, the Court will subject the government's
justifications to strict scrutiny, the same analytical method that it uses to
review policies that abridge fundamental rights.
During the 1970s, the Court came to the view that government policies drawing
distinctions based on sex, while not 'suspect' in the same way as racial
classifications, should nonetheless be subjected to at least heightened scrutiny.
In this manner the government's burden would be to show that the policy was
calculated to substantially advance an important governmental interest. When
the struggle for gay rights in the United States began to resort to the courts in
earnest during the second half of the twentieth century, major effort was been
directed towards persuading the courts that laws particularly abridging the
liberties of sexual minorities and subjecting them to unequal treatment should
either be subjected to strict or heightened scrutiny or, if evaluated under the
ordinary standard of rational basis, should be stricken as founded on prejudice
rather than legitimate policy concerns. The particular significance of the district
court decisions from 2010, discussed below, is that they may signal that this
effort of more than half a century is finally bearing substantial fruit.
II.
The Historic Unsuccessful Resort to Constitutional Litigation by Sexual
Minorities
The Supreme Court's first major decision in which sexual minorities sought to
challenge a government policy using this substantive individual rights
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5
frameworks was Bowers
v. Hardwick, 6 a case brought by a resident of Georgia
who had been arrested in his home when a police officer discovered him
engaging in oral sex with another man. The state of Georgia's penal code made
it a felony for anybody to engage in oral or anal sex under any circumstances.
The plaintiff, Michael Hardwick, contended that application of this law to his
private, consensual sexual conduct with another adult violated his due process
and equal protection rights. A federal trial court ruled against him, finding no
basis in prior appellate decisions for his claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 1 1 th Circuit reversed, finding that past decisions of the Supreme Court in
cases involving sexual privacy could support the argument that the statute
violated the Due Process Clause of the 14 th Amendment. The Supreme Court
granted the state of Georgia's petition for review, and issued its decision
reversing the court of appeals in 1986.

The Supreme Court framed the question before it as whether the Constitution
"1confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals" 7 (the right to engage in
consensual sodomy) and rejected the constitutional claim, asserting that the
conduct in this case bore no resemblance to the conduct that had been
protected in prior sexual privacy cases involving contraception and abortion.
The Court observed that sodomy had been subject to criminal penalties in all
the states by common law or statute from colonial times until the 1960s, when
some states began to adopt the recommendation of the drafters of the Model
Penal Code to remove penalties for private, consensual adult sexuality activity,
and thus the claimed right could not be characterized historically as a
fundamental right. At the time of the decision, more than half of the states still
maintained criminal penalties for consensual sodomy (oral or anal sex). The
Court characterized the plaintiff's contention that this conduct could be
constitutionally protected as "facetious," 8 asserting that the presumed moral
disapproval of homosexuality by the legislature provided a rational basis for the
law. The Court was sharply divided, voting 5-4, with strongly worded dissenting
opinions claiming that the Court had failed to apply its sexual privacy
precedents correctly, and that the history of penalization could not justify the
imposition of the criminal law on harmless private adult intimacies.
As a result of the Bowers decision, federal district courts and courts of appeals
over the ensuing decade, bound by Supreme Court precedent, were extremely
sceptical about both due process and equal protection claims brought by gay
litigants. If conduct that in some sense defined 'the class' could be outlawed by
the states, how could the court find that the government was not entitled to
treat members of the class as putative criminals, who could be excluded from
s In an earlier case, Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118 (1967), the
Court rejected a procedural due process challenge to a provision of the immigration law used
by the government to justify denying entry to or deporting homosexuals as "psychopathic
personalities." The Court rejected the due process claim that the term was too vague to meet
constitutional requirements. The case did not consider a substantive due process claim.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Ibid., at 190.
Ibid., at 194.
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the benefits of government programs and subject to discriminatory
treatment?9 Lawsuits brought during that period posing federal constitutional
challenges to the version of the regulatory ban on military service then in effect
as well as the exclusion from the right to marry of same-sex couples, were
uniformly unsuccessful. Inevitably, in cases where the courts concluded that
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification was implicated, the
challenged policies were deemed presumptively constitutional, and the
government could justify them- as Georgia had justified its sodomy law-by
reference to the presumed moral disapproval of homosexuality by the majority
of society and a desire to signal such disapproval through the imposition of
inferior status or treatment.
During this period, however, gay litigants responded to Bowers by diversifying
their litigation and political strategies, challenging sodomy laws in state courts
under state constitutions with some success, initiating claims that exclusion
from marriage violated state constitutional guarantees, and lobbying
legislatures for sodomy law repeal and the enactment of protection against
discrimination based on sexual orientation and, beginning in the 1990s, gender
identity. These efforts produced some successes and some failures. Sometimes
the successes provoked political backlash from opponents of gay rights, and
one such backlash led to the first Supreme Court case to counter the baleful
effect of Bowers, Romer v. Evans.10
Lobbying efforts in the state of Colorado had resulted in persuading several city
councils to enact local ordinances banning sexual orientation discrimination in
employment, housing and public accommodations, and also led to executive
adoption of similar policies, including an executive order by the governor
banning discrimination by the executive branch of the state government.
Opponents of gay rights successfully petitioned to place on the state-wide
ballot a constitutional amendment that would prohibit the state or any of its
subdivisions from adopting policies treating 'homosexuals' as a protected class.
Voters approve the measure in November 1992. Gay rights advocates
immediately filed a state court lawsuit challenging its constitutionality under
the 14 th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and won temporary injunctive
relief while the lawsuit was pending. The Colorado Supreme Court deemed the
measure unconstitutional on the ground that it would abridge the political
rights to equal participation by gay people, by disempowering the legislature
and local governments from enacting the kinds of policies described in the
amendment." The state government appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which affirmed on a different rationale in a decision announced in 1996.
According to the Supreme Court, the challenged Colorado Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional because it created a classification without any rational policy
justification. The Court described the amendment as a 'sweeping' measure that
See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 ( 9 th Cir. 1980).
10 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
11 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
9
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went far beyond what might have been necessary to achieve any legitimate
governmental interest that might be hypothesized to justify it. As such, the
Court said that it 'defied' conventional equal protection analysis, and so the
Court did not engage in such analysis to reach its decision. Instead, concluding
that the only plausible explanation for the enactment of this measure was
moral disapproval and dislike for homosexuals, the Court found that it violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it created a discriminatory classification
for its own sake. The Court asserted that no state could thus treat a group of
individuals as 'strangers to the law' without some non-discriminatory
justification.
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the Court's decision-which never
mentioned Bowers v. Hardwick-had either silently overruled that case or at
least reached a result that was inconsistent with it. Justice Scalia repeated the
rationale that lower federal courts had articulated for rejecting equal
protection claims after Bowers, and argued that 'seemingly tolerant'
Coloradans could have rationally concluded, without any animus, that their
government should not provide any 'special protection' to a group whose
members engage in conduct that is not constitutionally protected. Scalia
accused the majority of improperly taking sides in a 'culture war' rather than
applying accepted modes of legal analysis to reach its result.12 Responding in
the Court's opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy argued that the case was not
about 'special rights,' but rather the ordinary entitlement to equal protection of
the laws that people generally took for granted.
Neither opinion explicitly surfaced a major conceptual distinction between the
two cases: that Bowers explicitly dealt with conduct while Romer explicitly dealt
with status. This distinction had been elided by those lower courts - whose
opinions Scalia cited in dissent - that had relied upon Bowers to reject gay
equal protection claims. Where a majority of the Bowers court was willing to
count majoritarian moral disapproval for a particular conduct as a justification
for subjecting the conduct to criminal penalties, the Romer majority was not
willing to allow moral disapproval of a conduct associated with a particular
group of people to deprive that group of equal treatment under the law.
Possibly some of the justices in the Romer majority experienced the doctrinal
tension described by Scalia, but felt that the case before them did not require
them to confront Bowers directly, precisely because of this distinction. The
author of the Romer opinion, however, had signalled his concerns about
potential constitutional protection for homosexual conduct as a lower court
judge,' 3 and went on years later to author the Court's opinion overruling
Bowers.
While the Court's decision (by a 6-3 vote) was a welcome victory for sexual
minorities, it did not appear to have altered the doctrinal playing field
significantly. The Court did not identify sexual orientation as a suspect
12

517 U.S., at 636-653.

13

Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788

( 9 th

Cir. 1980).
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classification, did not discuss presumptions or burdens of proof and did not
mention or expressly apply heightened scrutiny, having concluded without
using any of those analytical terms that the measure failed to meet the least
demanding test of rationality. Many lower federal courts, ruling in the
aftermath of Romer, asserted that the Court had determined that sexual
orientation claims were to be evaluated using the deferential rationality test, 1 4
and continued to reject equal protection claims in most cases by hypothesizing
legitimate justifications for state action. In order to win an equal protection
claim in the aftermath of Romer, a gay litigant would have to show that the
challenged government policy or action was virtually inexplicable absent
animus, although some litigants won when the government proffered no
justification for discrimination because it claimed that no discrimination had
occurred. When a jury or judge found that discrimination had occurred, the gay
plaintiff would essentially win by default if the court could not imagine a
legitimate justification for the challenged action. 15
Advocates for sexual minorities continued to challenge sodomy laws in the
courts after Bowers, but focused their efforts on state courts, raising state
constitutional claims, until the end of the 1990s, when they began to test the
waters in the wake of Romer by asserting alternative federal constitutional
grounds. Marriage cases, on the other hand, were brought solely on state
constitutional grounds during this period, and were not successful prior to the
Supreme Court's next major gay rights decision, Lawrence v. Texas,16 in 2003.
Lawrence arose out of a sodomy prosecution. A police officer arrested John
Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner in Lawrence's bedroom, claiming to have
observed them engaging in unlawful sexual conduct with each other. A Justice
of the Peace convicted them under the state's Homosexual Conduct Act, which
prohibited same sex anal or oral sex as a misdemeanour. They appealed,
preserving at every step their claim that the application of the law to them was
unconstitutional under the state and federal constitutions, but the state courts
rejected their arguments. The Supreme Court granted review, agreeing to
consider whether the Homosexual Conduct Act violated either the Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment, and specifically whether
Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled.
The Supreme Court concluded that the statute violated the appellants'
constitutional rights. A majority of the Court (five members) joined an opinion
For a detailed discussion of the phenomenon of the lingering impact
of Bowers after Romer,
see A. Leonard, 'Exorcizing the Ghosts of Bowers v. Hardwick: Uprooting Invalid Precedents',
Chicago-Kent Law Review 2009-84, p. 519.
15 For example, in Quinn v. Nassau County Police Department,
53 F.Supp.2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999),
the defendants, denying that they had subjected the plaintiff to improper harassment and
discrimination on account of his sexual orientation, offered no justification for their actions,
and the court, having found the plaintiffs factual allegations to be true and being unable to
imagine a legitimate policy justification for subjecting a gay police officer to harassment, ruled
for the plaintiff.
16 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14
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by Justice Kennedy that premised the ruling on the Due Process Clause, finding
that private, consensual homosexual conduct involving adults came within the
liberty protected by that provision, while one member of the Court (Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, who had been part of the voting majority in Bowers)
preferred to base the ruling on the Equal Protection Clause, arguing that the
Homosexual Conduct Act drew a line between gay and non-gay people for no
legitimate reason, while the three dissenters would have reaffirmed Bowers as
controlling. After declaring that Bowers had been wrongly decided and should
be overruled, the operative sentence of the majority's opinion stated: "The
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion
into the personal and private life of the individual."1 7
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinions for the Court in both Romer and Lawrence.
As he had done in Romer, where he avoided using the terminology of suspect
classification and heightened scrutiny, in Lawrence he refrained from explicitly
discussing whether the case involved a fundamental right or merited the
application of heightened scrutiny, instead asserting that Bowers was wrongly
decided, as inconsistent with the Court's prior rulings on issues such as birth
control and abortion (where the Court had used fundamental rights and strict
scrutiny language), and that no legitimate justification for impinging on the
liberty of individuals engaging in private consensual homosexual conduct had
been shown. Kennedy conceded that a 'tenable argument' could be made that
the state law violated equal protection, but asserted that it was necessary to
overrule Bowers and premise the case on due process, to ensure that nobody
could argue that the decision left it open to the states that still criminalized
such conduct to preserve their laws by applying the sodomy ban equally to
"different-sex participants" as well as "same-sex participants."' 8 Kennedy also
observed that the concepts of "equality of treatment" and "due process right to
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty" were
"linked in important respects," and that a due process ruling would also further
the interest in equal protection. 19
Lawrence, like Romer, was an important victory, striking down a law that
overtly discriminated against gay people and, implicitly, striking down all
remaining laws criminalizing consensual sodomy involving adults acting in
private. Sodomy laws sustained by majoritarian moral disapproval of
homosexuality had long undergirded the entire legal regime of anti-gay
government policies. But the ultimate doctrinal impact of Lawrence was no
more obvious than that of Romer when the opinions were first announced.
Because the Court refrained from using such terms as 'suspect classification' or
'fundamental right' or 'heightened scrutiny' in conducting its analysis, it
remained open to lower courts to conclude that nothing had changed,
doctrinally, apart from the precise holdings of the two cases: that laws overtly
discriminating against gay people cannot be hypothetically justified by anti-gay
17 Ibid.,

at 578.

i lbid., at 574-5.
Idem.
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animus, and that criminal prosecution may not be applied to private,
consensual non-commercial adult homosexual conduct.
Perhaps the best illustration of the doctrinal uncertainty left in the wake of
Romer and Lawrence was the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the 1 1 th Circuit in Lofton v. Secretary, Department of Children and Family
Services,20 a case involving a due process and equal protection challenge to a
Florida statute forbidding 'homosexuals' from adopting children. The statute
was adopted in 1977 in the wake of a furiously waged campaign over a voter
initiative to repeal a local ordinance forbidding sexual orientation
discrimination in Dade County, Florida. Proponents of repeal premised their
campaign on the necessity to protect children from being exposed to openly
gay public school teachers, and argued generally that exposure to homosexuals
was harmful to the normal development of children. As a majority of the
county's voters repealed the local ordinance, the state legislature was inspired
to codify the electoral campaign's message by enacting a statutory ban on
homosexuals adopting children.
Prior attempts to invalidate the Florida statute in state court litigation were
unsuccessful, and a new challenge was mounted in federal district court after
the Romer decision. But the 11th Circuit majority, ruling after Lawrence, found
that neither Romer nor Lawrence required subjecting the law to heightened
scrutiny, applied the deferential rationality test, and hypothesized that Florida
legislators could have believed that children were better off in traditional
families headed by different-sex couples and thus were motivated by the best
interest of children rather than by animus against homosexuals in passing the
statute.
Such justifications would not likely have carried the day in a heightened
scrutiny case, in light of the positions taken by professional organizations
concerned with child welfare. (The Child Welfare League of America filed an
amicus brief in support of the plaintiff, summarizing the views from
professional journals.) Had the state been required to prove that being raised
by gay parents was harmful to children, they would not have been able to meet
that burden, since by the 2 1st century the professional literature on child
development no longer provided support for the government's case. The
Supreme Court's subsequent refusal to review the 11th Circuit's decision,
although not a ruling on the merits, might be construed by lower courts to
confirm the conclusion that a state policy that overtly excluded or
disadvantaged gay people was presumptively constitutional and could be
adequately justified by reference to unproven conventional wisdom and
traditional stereotypes. The 11th Circuit's analytical approach was followed by
some other federal courts in the years immediately following Lawrence, but
changes were brewing as new challenges to policies adversely affecting gay
people were brought in state and federal courts.
Lofton v. Secretary, 358 F.3d 804 (1 1th Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc denied, 377 F.3d
1275 (2004), petition for certiorari denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
20
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Ill. The Miraculous Year of 2010
During 2010, federal district courts issued a series of rulings using the due
process or equal protection doctrines to invalidate laws that adversely affected
gay people, decisively rejecting the kind of rationalizations that had previously
been accepted by numerous courts. The accumulation of significant rulings in
cases that had been pending before the courts for several years suggested that
a new consensus might be emerging among federal judges rejecting the
traditional arguments that had been made to support such policies. As
important as the substantive results in these cases-the declaration that
particular laws were unconstitutional- were the doctrinal results that might be
transferable to other on-going disputes over gay rights.
111.1 The Military Cases
One of the longest-running gay rights legal battles concerns military service.
Military penal law condemned all 'sodomy' from early times. Prior to World
War II the armed forces adopted their first categorical policies supporting the
exclusion of homosexuals from enlistment, and their discharge if discovered in
the service, based on the assertion that homosexuality was incompatible with
military service. During the post-war period, regulations allowed a degree of
discretion to commanders to retain homosexuals in the ranks, but the strong
inclination was towards dismissal unless pressing staffing needs outweighed
other concerns. As early as the 1970s, gay people were litigating over
discriminatory military policies with mixed results. 21 The Defense Department
reacted to some litigation setbacks by revising the policy to be nondiscretionary, but President William J. Clinton's election in 1992 after his pledge
to end the ban led to the first legislative consideration of the topic. All prior
policies had been based on regulations generated internally by the military,
whose leadership was firmly opposed to any change. The legislative process
resulted in a compromise policy enacted in 1993, under which gay people
would be allowed to serve only if they kept their sexuality secret and it was not
discovered by military officials - the so-called Don't Ask Don't Tell policy
(DADT). Attempts to challenge DADT after Romer foundered, most notably in a
major test case brought jointly by leading LGBT rights organizations, Able v.
22
United States. The courts insisted that the extensive record of Congressional
hearings in 1993 leading to the DADT policy made it impossible to reject the
policy under rationality review, as the hearing record included sworn testimony
from numerous top military officials that allowing openly gay people to serve
would compromise the ability of the military to fulfill its national defence
functions effectively. This purported justification, combined with the deference
to military judgment that has marked judicial consideration of challenges to
military policies, was enough to doom the challenge.

See, e.g., Matlovitch v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C.Cir. 1978);
Berg v.
Claytor, 591 F.2d 849 (D.C.Cir. 1978).
22 155 F.3d 628 (2d.
Cir. 1998).
21
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After Lawrence, two courts of appeals concluded for the first time that pending
challenges to the military policy based on due process arguments would merit
heightened scrutiny rather than rationality review. First the 9th Circuit (in Witt v
Department of the Air Force) 23 and then the 1 st Circuit (in Cook v. Gates) 24
concluded that Lawrence was only explicable as a heightened scrutiny case,
suggesting that any government policy that burdened the liberty interest
protected by the 5th Amendment Due Process clause could be sustained only if
the government demonstrated an important policy interest that was
substantially furthered by the challenged policy. Both courts, of course,
recognized that national security and defence were important policy concerns,
indeed compelling interests, but under heightened scrutiny the government
would have to show that the ban substantially advanced those policies. At the
same time, both courts held that prior precedents in their circuits mandated
using the deferential rationality test to evaluate the plaintiffs' alternative equal
protection claims, which must consequently be dismissed.
These preliminary determinations led to different results in the two pending
cases. The 9 th Circuit held that in a case involving the discharge of an individual
service member under the policy (an 'as applied' challenge to the policy), the
government's burden would be to show that discharging this particular
individual would substantially advance an important interest, and remanded
the case for trial. The 1st Circuit case, however, was a test case that did not
contest specific discharges but rather mounted a facial challenge to the statute
by an organization representing LGB service members. The court held that in
light of the required deference to military judgment and the substantial
legislative history, the policy would survive heightened scrutiny and no trial was
needed.
The case that would bring all the strands together and result in one of the two
miraculous 2010 decisions involving military policy was a test case brought by
an organization called Log Cabin Republicans (LCR), which filed suit in the
federal district court in Riverside, California (within the 9 th Circuit), shortly after
Lawrence, seeking a declaration of facial invalidity of the policy. Lengthy pretrial skirmishing over issues of standing and discovery delayed the trial until
2010. Prior to trial before District Judge Virginia Phillips, the court ruled that
under Witt the plaintiffs' equal protection claim must be dismissed, but that its
due process (and free speech 1st Amendment) claims should go to trial.
Significantly, the court also held that in light of the 9 th Circuit's Witt ruling, it
would apply heightened scrutiny as its standard of judicial review, placing the
burden on the government to show that the policy actually substantially
advanced the national defence and security interests that the government
would normally raise to justify it.
Judge Phillips ruled on September 9, 2010, that the government failed to meet
its burden. The government had rested its case heavily on the 1993 legislative
23
24

527 F.3d 806, en banc review denied, 548 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2008).
528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
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record, but the world had changed since 1993, with many of America's major
military allies having abandoned their own exclusionary military policies.
American troops were serving together in the Middle East with troops from
allied countries that allowed gay people to serve openly without any obvious
disruption. U.S. military staffing needs skyrocketed with the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan but the government did not wish to adopt conscription and, in
order to fulfil enlistment needs, had relaxed educational standards and
abandoned routine exclusion of applicants with criminal records. Contrary to
the 'justifications' for gay exclusion cited by Congress in 1993, gay people were
not quickly dismissed when discovered shortly before or during overseas
assignment to conflict areas, but instead processed for discharge on grounds of
homosexuality on a more selective basis. The district judge found that these
factors fatally undermined the government's purported justification for
maintaining the ban, and mandated a declaration of unconstitutionality and
injunctive relief. The court issued an amended version of its opinion on October
10. The government sought a stay pending appeal, which the trial court denied
but the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals granted. 25
Meanwhile, events were proceeding in parallel in the other pending challenge
to the military policy within the 9 th Circuit, the Witt case. On September 24,
2010, District Judge Ronald B. Leighton of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington found that the government had failed to show
how the discharge of Air Force Reserve Major Margaret Witt, a highlydecorated military nurse, had advanced any of the polices articulated to justify
the policy. Major Witt had been discharged when it was discovered that she
had engaged in a discreet same-sex relationship with a civilian while off-duty
and off-base. Her commanders had testified that there was no reason other
than the policy to discharge her, and the court received evidence that her
discharge had adversely affected morale in the operation where she had
worked. The court ordered the reinstatement of Major Witt, should she apply
and be otherwise qualified. The government quickly appealed, obtaining a stay
of the court's order pending the outcome.26
The government's losses in these two cases became part of the argument used
by the Obama Administration to persuade Congress to end the policy. Early in
2010 the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, had appointed a special working
group to study how the policy could be ended without harming military
effectiveness, in line with President Barack Obama's campaign pledge in 2008
to seek an end to the policy. The two court decisions were announced while the
working group was doing its research and preparing its report towards the
deadline of December 1. A measure authorizing repeal of the policy was
attached to a military spending bill pending in the House of Representatives
and was actually approved as part of the spending bill early in this process, but
attempts to move it forward in the Senate on the same basis encountered
Log Cabin Republicans v. U.S., 2010 WL 4136210 (9th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court rejected
a motion to vacate the stay, Log Cabin Republicans v. U.S., 131 S.Ct. 589 (2010).
26 Witt v. U.S. Department of the Air Force, 739 F.Supp.2d 1308
(W.D.Wash. 2010).
25
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substantial opposition from the Republican leadership, not least because of
other features of the bill that the Republicans found objectionable, most
specifically a measure to extend U.S. citizenship to undocumented aliens who
served in the Armed Forces. Although Republicans held a minority of seats in
the Senate, under that chamber's operative rules a minority of at least fortyone members can block consideration of pending legislation, and the
Republicans controlled enough seats to prevent a vote on the military bill.
In the November 2010 elections, the Republicans won control of the House and
increased the size of their minority in the Senate, making it likely that repeal of
the policy would not be attainable after the new Congress convened in January
2011. At the end of November, the Defense Department working group
submitted its report, concluding that repeal of the policy could be
accomplished in a deliberative way, involving the adoption of various new
policies and educational programs within the military. Armed with the report
and the threat posed by the recent court decisions, Secretary Gates argued to
Congress that letting the policy be ended by the courts was the less desirable
course since it would require immediate changes rather than the gradual,
orderly implementation outlined in the working group's report. After another
attempt to pass the military spending bill in the Senate was unsuccessful, a
group of proponents for repeal in both houses worked out a strategy to create
a stand-alone 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act,' and put it up quickly for a vote.
Shorn of its attachment to other controversial measures, the measure narrowly
passed the Senate (with the support of enough Republican senators to
overcome the prior rules barrier) and was quickly approved by the House and
signed into law by President Obama on December 22, 2010.27 Under its terms,
the policy will end sixty days after the President, the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in effect, the chief uniformed military
commander) jointly certify in writing to Congress that all necessary policy
changes have been undertaken and that the change in policy will not adversely
affect the operation of the armed forces. At this writing, it is expected that the
'don't ask, don't tell' policy will be ended before the end of 2011, as President
Obama pledged in January 2011 during his annual State of the Union address to
Congress, when the Defense Department was undertaking the necessary
implementation plans.
Because the prior policy remained in effect, the appeals of the district court
rulings continued before the 9 th Circuit, putting the government in the now
ironic position of having to argue to justify a policy that had just been repealed
at the urging of the Obama Administration. The government urged the 9 th
Circuit to delay briefing, argument and decision of the cases, in anticipation
that they would become moot when the policy ended, but the court was
unwilling to play that game, as the winning plaintiffs pointed out that the
repeal statute set no firm deadline for ending the policy and the Defence
Department had refused to commit in advance to a date certain when it would
be willing to make the necessary certification to Congress.
27

Pub.L. 111-321 (Dec. 22, 2010).
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But the particulars of the ongoing litigation are less important to the theme of
this article than are the doctrinal developments of the two trial court opinions
and their potential impact in future cases involving government policies that
disadvantage gay people, for this is the first litigation in which such government
policies have been declared unconstitutional using heightened scrutiny in a Due
Process challenge. Because of the 9th Circuit's ruling remanding the Witt case
for trial and requiring the government to justify its actions under the
heightened scrutiny standard, as well as the subsequent rulings in both Witt
and Log Cabin Republicans finding that the government failed to meet its
burden, important new ground had been broken. Even if the cases are
eventually deemed moot because the challenged policy has been abandoned
by the government, the published court opinions stand and are likely to be very
influential in future Due Process cases, especially when one considers that they
were rendered in the context of the military where the rule of deference to the
judgments of government officials (military leaders) is normally very strong and
virtually outcome-determinative.

111.2 Federal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages
Congress approved the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 28 in 1996, and it was
signed into law by President Bill Clinton shortly before the national election.
DOMA was a response to marriage litigation begun in Hawaii several years
before. A group of same-sex couples had filed suit in state court, contending
that the denial of marriage licenses to them violated the state constitution's
due process and equal protection guarantees. Although a trial court had
dismissed their case, the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed in Baehr v. Lewin, a
1993 decision holding that refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry was a
form of sex discrimination and that sex was a suspect classification under the
Hawaii constitution.29 This meant that at the subsequent trial, the marriage
policy would be presumed unconstitutional unless the state could show that it
was necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Facially discriminatory
policies based on suspect classifications rarely survive judicial review, so it
seemed likely, in prospect, that the trial scheduled for October 1996 could
result in a ruling for the plaintiffs. At the same time, speculation flourished
among gay rights activists and in the media that if same-sex marriage became
legal in Hawaii, where there was no residency requirement to obtain a marriage
license, same-sex couples from all over the United States would descend on
Hawaii to get married and then return to their home states asserting that their
marriages must be recognized in accord with the Full Faith and Credit Clause
(Article IV, Section 1) of the United States Constitution, which provides that

28

29

Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Hi. 1993).
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"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
That such then-startling legal developments (the Hawaii ruling was the first by
any appellate court anywhere to suggest that denying the right to marry to
same-sex couples might be unconstitutional or unlawful) were occurring during
a congressional and presidential election year threatened to make same-sex
marriage a major campaign issue. The Republicans, seeking to hold their
recently acquired congressional majorities and to reclaim the White House
from President Clinton, sought to make it so. Republicans in Congress
introduced the Defense of Marriage Act and clearly signalled their intention to
make opposition to same-sex marriage a major campaign issue, to the
discomfiture of those Democrats who relied upon the gay community as an
important part of their electoral base and source of volunteers and campaign
donations. Public opinion polling showed little support for same-sex marriage in
the electorate, and some Democrats made a pragmatic calculation that it was
wise to take this issue off the table. As a result, the Defense of Marriage Act
quickly won bipartisan sponsorship and the endorsement of President Clinton,
effectively taking the same-sex marriage issue out of the election.
In setting forth purposes underlying the legislative determination that only
different-sex marriages should be recognized for purposes of federal law, the
House Report on the bill that became DOMA makes clear that the legislation
was intended to embody opposition to same-sex marriage and to "defend the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage." The other specific goals the
Report articulated included to encourage "responsible procreation and childrearing," to conserve scarce resources by ensuring that married same-sex
couples would not be entitled to federal benefits, and to express Congress's
moral disapproval of homosexuality "and a moral conviction that
heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian)
morality."0 o
Shortly after the November election, the Hawaii trial court ruled for the
plaintiffs,3 ' but the decision was stayed pending appeal, and the Hawaii
Supreme Court delayed considering until it had been mooted by the passage of
a state constitutional amendment that provided that only the legislature had
authority to determine whether same-sex couples could marry.3 2
Meanwhile DOMA went into effect. At the time, it was a statute bereft of a
reason for existence, other than its political utility in the 1996 election, for at
that time same-sex marriage was unobtainable for United States residents.
DOMA had two operative provisions. Section 2 provided that no state would be
obligated to extend full faith and credit to same-sex marriages performed in
H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905.
v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Hi. Cir. Ct., 1st Cir. 1996).
32 Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Hi. 1999)(table), full text of Summary
Disposition Order, which
is summarized at 26 BNA Fam. L. Rep. 1075 (December 14, 1999), can be found at
http://fl.bna.com/fl/20371.htm (3 May, 2011).
30

31Baehr
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other states, but at that time no same-sex marriages were being performed in
any states. Section 3 provided that the federal government would not recognize
any of the non-existent same-sex marriages for any purpose of federal law. As
no state authorized same-sex marriages at that time, Section 3 had no apparent
operative effect. Section 3 stood as a policy statement for courts to invoke
against same-sex couples seeking some sort of recognition of their relationships
by the federal government, but because nobody could get married, nobody had
actual standing to challenge the constitutionality of DOMA during this period of
its existence.
The weight of DOMA became real once same-sex marriages became available.
Early in the 2 1 st century, various foreign jurisdictions began to extend the right
to marry to same-sex couples and, after the Supreme Court decided Lawrence
v. Texas in 2003, marriage litigation based on state constitutional claims began
to achieve some limited success within the United States. In November 2003,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health34 that same-sex couples in that state had a right to marry,
ordering that the decision be implemented in a period of six months.
Subsequent same-sex marriage rulings yielded mixed results, but within a few
years the right to marry had been declared by courts in several other states,
and questions of marriage recognition across state lines and by the federal
government emerged.3 5 Same-sex couples who married in Massachusetts,
especially those who were federal employees, immediately began encountering
the kinds of problems posed by the failure of the federal government to
recognize their marriages, due to disqualification from various federal benefits
that are routinely available to spouses of public employees.
Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), a public interest law firm in
Boston, filed suit in federal court on behalf of some married same-sex couples
and some surviving spouses from same-sex marriages, claiming that the federal
government's failure to recognize their marriages for purposes of particular
benefits or programs normally available to married federal employees or their
surviving spouses violated the obligation of equal protection of the laws under
Ruling several years prior to Lawrence, the Vermont Supreme Court held in Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), that denying the rights and benefits of marriage under state law to
same-sex couples violated the "Equal Benefits" provision of the state constitution, but a
majority of the court did not conclude that this mandated a right to marry. The Vermont
legislature responded to the decision by enacting a Civil Union Act, under which same-sex
couples could form civil unions that would be treated as a state-law equivalent of marriage.
Almost a decade later, the Vermont legislature voted to abandon the distinction between
marriages and civil unions and make marriage available to same-sex couples.
34 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. Sup.Ct. 2003).
3s As of March 2011, the states of Connecticut (2008), Iowa (2009), Massachusetts (2004), New
Hampshire (2010), and Vermont (2009), and the District of Columbia (2010) authorize same-sex
marriage. Unsuccessful same-sex marriage litigation during the first decade of the 2 1st century
occurred in New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Washington, and Oregon. The California Supreme
Court ruled in favour of same-sex marriage in 2008, and several thousand couples married
pursuant to its decision, but the public approved an initiative amendment to the state
constitution that end the performance of same-sex marriages later that year, and is currently
under federal constitutional attack, as described in part 111.3 of this article, below.
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the 5th Amendment. The state's attorney general filed a parallel lawsuit,
alleging that the federal government's failure to recognize lawfully contracted
same-sex marriages of Massachusetts residents violated the federal scheme
under which states determine who can marry, and improperly forced the state
itself to discriminate against its own married same-sex couples in administering
programs that were subject to federal requirements, in violation of the
Spending Clause (Article 1,Section 8) of the Constitution. 37 This was, in effect, a
double barrelled assault on Section 3 of DOMA.
Because prior 1 st Circuit precedents specified that equal protection claims by
gay litigants did not involve a suspect classification
and because their
benefits claims did not involve fundamental rights, the plaintiffs confronted a
presumption that Section 3 was constitutional, assuming the burden of showing
that there was no rational basis for its enactment, normally a very difficult task.
In this case, however, by focusing narrowly on the specific benefits that were
being denied, the plaintiffs were able to make the argument that the sweeping
disqualification imposed by Section 3 could not be justified in its application to
their particular claims. In its rush to enact DOMA in 1996, Congress had not
devoted any time to analyze the policy justifications for denying access to
legally married same-sex couples to all of the individual benefits and
entitlements strewn throughout the United States Code, and a report from the
Government Accountability Office enumerating these provisions was not even
requested until after the measure was enacted, so only the most general sorts
of justifications were stated in the legislative history.
Although in a rational basis case the government has no burden of proof or
production, nonetheless the government sought to defend Section 3 by posing
hypothetical justifications, as it decided to disavow the reasons for the statute
that were recited in the legislative history, some of which the Obama
Administration would find politically awkward to argue because they
contradicted positions the president had taken in his election campaign and in
the party platform. The government argued that Congress could plausibly have
desired to preserve a uniform approach under federal law to the definition of
marriage while the issue of whether same-sex marriage would be allowed was
being debated and answered differently in different state, and that Section 3
could be construed to be taking a neutral position in the heated marriage
debate and preserving the federal status quo ante as the issue of same-sex
marriage played out on a state by state basis. The government defended DOMA
as the sort of incremental approach to a newly emerging social issue that
Congress may decide to employ. These arguments were easily refuted by the
plaintiffs, since refusing to recognize marriage was hardly neutral, and District
Judge Joseph L. Tauro decisively rejected each of these justifications as failing

Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F.Supp.2d 473 (D. Mass. 2010).
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 698
F.Supp.2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010).
E.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1t Cir. 2008).
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to "ground a rational relationship between the classification employed and a
legitimate governmental objective," in his decision issued on July 8, 2010.39
Judge Tauro found that the determination of who could marry is allocated to
the states in the American federal system, and rejected the contention that the
federal government had any legitimate interest in preserving some sort of
uniform definition of marriage for purposes of federal benefits. Indeed, the
status quo ante under federal law from the foundation of the country until the
enactment of DOMA accommodated variations in state marriage law by
recognizing all lawfully contracted marriages for federal purposes, including
during the period when some states allowed mixed-race marriages and others
prohibited them. Even with the end of laws against mixed-race marriage in
1967, there remained variations among the states in the age at which
individuals could marry and in whether first cousins could marry. DOMA was
the first attempt by Congress to dictate a uniform definition of marriage for
federal law and, as such did not preserve the status quo. Judge Tauro also
rejected the argument that preserving the status quo could be a legitimate
interest, or that DOMA necessarily established federal consistency, since the
other variations among state marriage laws remained and only same-sex
couples were disadvantaged by the application of Section 3. Judge Tauro also
rejected administrative convenience as a justification for unequal treatment,
and found that uniformity could not serve as a sufficient rational explanation
for a sweeping measure disqualifying married same-sex couples from equal
treatment under the more than 1,000 federal laws that use the terms
'marriage' or 'spouse. 4 0
Judge Tauro concluded that under DOMA "it is only sexual orientation that
differentiates a married couple entitled to federal marriage-based benefits
from one not so entitled," and the court "can conceive of no way in which such
a difference might be relevant to the provision of benefits at issue." Tauro
observed that by premising benefits on marriage in the various federal benefits
laws, Congress had distinguished between married and unmarried people,
using marital status as the dividing line. Once states allowed same-sex couples
to marry, there had to be some salient distinction between different-sex and
same-sex married couples to justify unequal treatment, but dividing the class of
married couples created, in Judge Tauro's view, 'a distinction without meaning,'
leaving the court to conclude that "it is only irrational prejudice that motivates
the challenged classification." Irrational prejudice is not sufficient to sustain a
statute that facially discriminates. 4 1
On the same date, Judge Tauro ruled in the parallel case brought by the
Attorney General of Massachusetts, Martha Coakley, claiming a violation of the
699 F.Supp.2d at 390.
The court was referring to a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared in
response to the original enactment of DOMA in 1996 and update to reflect subsequent federal
legislation through 2004, GAO-04-353R Defense of Marriage Act (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf (3 May 2011)
41 699 F.Supp.2d at
396-397.
40
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10th Amendment (which provides that powers not specifically delegated in the
constitution to the federal government are reserved to the states and the
people, respectively) and the Spending Clause (Article 1, Section 8). The court
denied the government's motion to dismiss, and granted the plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment, finding that through the enactment of Section 3 the
federal government had exceeded its power under the federal scheme by
improperly trenching on the state's authority (state sovereignty) in the area of
domestic relations, and exceeded its power under the Spending Clause by
requiring the state to distinguish between same-sex and different-sex married
couples in the administration of various programs carried out with federal
funds, in violation of the state's own constitutional obligations to its citizens. 4 2
The parties agreed that relief pursuant to the court's order granting the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be stayed pending the
government's appeal, and the government promptly appealed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 1st Circuit, in Boston. But the court's decision prompted
GLAD to file a new lawsuit in Connecticut on November 9,43 on behalf of
married same-sex couples from several New England states, and the American
Civil Liberties Union filed another lawsuit in New York on the same day, 44
representing a same-sex surviving spouse who suffered the onerous tax
consequences of non-recognition of her marriage by the Internal Revenue
Service, both cases raising new challenges to Section 3. Judge Tauro was not
alone among the federal courts in questioning the government's justifications
for Section 3, either, as U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken subsequently denied
the government's motion to dismiss a DOMA suit pending in California, in an
opinion generally agreeing with Tauro's analysis. 45
Connecticut and New York are within the 2nd Circuit, where there is no
appellate precedent on the appropriate level of judicial review of sexual
orientation discrimination claims. In seeking to dismiss the complaint or to file
an answer, the federal government, which had litigated in Gill with rational
basis as the 1st Circuit standard of review, would have to make an argument in
response to the plaintiffs' contentions that DOMA should be subjected to
heightened scrutiny. Preparing to respond to the complaints, Justice
Department attorneys concluded that the heightened scrutiny standard should
apply in these cases and that Section 3 was not defensible under such a
standard. Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., concurred with his staff and
forwarded the legal analysis to President Barack Obama, who agreed. As a
result, the Department of Justice announced on February 23, 2011, that it
Commonwealth v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 698 F.Supp.2d 234 (D.
Mass. 2010).
43 Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management, No. 3:10-cv-1750 (D.Conn., filed November 9,
2010).
44 Windsor v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y., filed November 9, 2010).
4
Dragovich v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2011 Westlaw 175502 (N.D.Cal.
2011)(challenging Section 3 in the context of a federal Internal Revenue Code provision relied
upon by California officials to denying same-sex couples married in California in 2008 the right
to participate in a group insurance program).
42
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would not oppose the argument that heightened scrutiny applied in these two
pending cases, and that it would not argue that Section 3 survived heightened
scrutiny, although it would continue to enforce Section 3 until Congress
repealed it or the appellate courts definitively declared it unconstitutional.
A letter signed by Attorney General Holder was sent that day to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, Representative John Boehner, explaining the
Administration's position that it would no longer defend Section 3 in pending
litigation, and pointing out that Congress could seek to defend the statute on
its own. 46 Holder indicated that the Justice Department would continue to
represent the United States in these lawsuits, and would take any steps
necessary to facilitate the ability of Congress to defend the statute. Two days
later, the Department sent a letter to Speaker Boehner listing the various cases
in which challenges to Section 3 were pending in federal court and advising on
their procedural posture. Depending how one counts consolidated cases, it
appeared that there were at least nine cases, with more sure to be filed as a
result of the Administration's announcement of its position. The Justice
Department also notified the 1st Circuit that it would not substantively defend
Section 3 against the Equal Protection challenge in the pending appeals from
Judge Tauro's decisions.
It seems highly likely that Judge Tauro's July 8 rulings contributed to the Justice
Department's decision against defending Section 3. Tauro struck the Section
using a rational basis analysis, due to prevailing 1 st Circuit precedent, but his
discussion of the various justifications argued by the Justice Department
undoubtedly contributed to the Department's conclusion that if heightened
scrutiny applied, Section 3 was sure to fall. The Department's conclusion that
heightened scrutiny applied was unexpected, however, since the
Administration had been successfully litigating gay equal protection claims
concerning the military under the rational basis standard for some time. (In
Witt, Log Cabin Republicans, and Cook, the courts had rejected equal
protection challenges to DADT out of hand.) The analysis set out in General
Holder's letter to Speaker Boehner relied on the conclusion that Romer v. Evans
did not establish a standard of review for such claims, and that a
straightforward application of the analysis the Supreme Court had been using in
equal protection cases supported a requirement of heightened scrutiny in
sexual orientation cases, finding that as a classification it met all the criteria
that the Supreme Court had discussed in dealing with the standard of review in
other cases. The House leadership subsequently authorized the Legal Counsel
to the House to undertake the defence of Section 3 in pending litigation, and
former U.S. Solicitor General Paul Clement, now in private practice, was
retained for that purpose.

Letter from Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act,
Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Wednesday, February 23, 2011, available at
http://www.iustice.gov/opa/pr/2011/Februarv/11-ag-223.html (3 May 2011).
46
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The Justice Department's announcement and sudden retreat in the pending
DOMA challenges sealed Judge Tauro's rulings as the second component of the
miraculous 2010 developments in LGBT rights law in the United States.
111.3 The Proposition 8 Litigation in California
On May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court ruled that a California statute
prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the state constitution.47 Same-sex
couples began getting married when the decision became effective a month
later, and continued to do so until November 5, 2008, the day after the
election, when state officials announced that voters had approved Proposition
8, an initiative proposal to take the contested statutory provision and turn it
into a state constitutional provision.
Opponents of Proposition 8 immediately filed an action in the California
Supreme Court, claiming that Proposition 8 had not been validly enacted in
conformity with state constitutional requirements. That court ruled on May 26,
2009, in Strauss v. Horton, that Proposition 8 was validly enacted, but that the
couples who had married between June and November remained validly
married and that the enactment of Proposition 8 did not affect the status of
individuals who were registered as domestic partners in California, a status
carrying almost all of the state law rights of marriage. 48
A few days earlier, anticipating the possibility that the California Supreme Court
would reject the procedural challenge to Proposition 8, the American
Foundation for Equal Rights (AFER), a non-profit organization specifically
formed to litigate for the restoration of same-sex marriage in California, had
filed suit on May 22 in the United States District Court in San Francisco,
contending that the enactment of Proposition 8 violated the 14th Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 49 The filing of Perry v. Schwarzenegger
attracted widespread media attention, at least in part because co-counsel for
the plaintiffs were Theodore Olson, the conservative former Solicitor General of
the United States during the first term of President George W. Bush, who had
represented President Bush in the Supreme Court case that determined the
result of the 2000 presidential election, and David Boies, a leading liberal
Democratic lawyer who had represented Vice President Albert Gore in that
same Supreme Court case. 50 That these ideological opposites would join
together to challenge the enactment of Proposition 8 immediately lent
extraordinary public interest to the case. The chief judge of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, Vaughn R.Walker, was assigned to
hear the case.
Not only was the case unusual in light of the identity of co-counsel for the
plaintiffs (nominally two same-sex couples who had unsuccessfully applied for
In Re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal.4th 757, 183 P.3d 384 (2008).
Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal.4th 364, 207 P.3d 48 (2009).
49 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 09-2292 VRW (N.D.Cal., filed May 22, 2009).
so Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
47
48
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marriage licenses after Proposition 8 was passed), but also because of the
response to the lawsuit by the defendants. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
and Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr., who were named as lead
defendants together with the head of the marriage license bureau and the
county clerks who had denied the plaintiffs' license applications, indicated that
they were not willing to defend Proposition 8 from constitutional attack. Both
of these officials had opposed its enactment, and the attorney general had
stated his doubts about the constitutionality of the measure in responding to
the complaint in Strauss v. Horton. Judge Walker granted a motion by the
organization that had proposed Proposition 8, ProtectMarriage.com, and its
leaders (generally referred to as the Proponents), to intervene as defendants in
order to provide a substantive defence, and also granted a motion by the City
of San Francisco to intervene in support of the plaintiffs. But he denied
intervention motions by various LGBT rights organizations who had participated
in the original California marriage case, and a motion by the Assistant Clerk of
Imperial County to intervene on behalf of defendants. The plaintiffs had
opposed intervention by the LGBT rights groups, as these groups had strongly
opposed the filing of the lawsuit. However, the plaintiffs raised no objections to
these groups filing amicus curiae briefs.
Pre-trial skirmishing lasted until early 2010, when a trial was held on January 11
to 27.51 The plaintiffs testified as to their experiences and the impact of denial
of marriage on their lives. Numerous experts on behalf of the plaintiffs were
presented to compile a rich factual record on virtually all the points that might
be contested regarding same-sex couples, parenting and marriage. The
defendants presented only two experts, whose testimony about why marriage
had to be denied to same-sex couples was deemed lacking in credibility by
Judge Walker.
The court issued its ruling on August 4, 2010. Judge Walker found that
Proposition 8 deprived same-sex couples of a fundamental right, the right to
marry, 52 and so theoretically should be subjected to the strict scrutiny
approach, under which the measure would only survive if it was shown to be
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. However, his analysis of the
record led him to conclude that Proposition 8 could not withstand the usual
deferential rational basis review, so he found it unnecessary to employ strict
scrutiny to make a ruling. Similarly, he found it unnecessary to determine
whether sexual orientation was a suspect classification, as he found that "the
An important part of the pre-trial skirmishing involved Judge Walker's decision, with the
approval of the 9th Circuit, to have the proceedings simultaneously broadcast in several federal
courthouses around the country in order to satisfy public interest in the proceedings. The
Proponents appealed this decision, arguing that broadcasting would deter their experts from
testifying, and won a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court prohibiting the broadcast, just a day
prior to the commencement of the trial. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S.Ct. 705 (2010).
52 The right to marry has been recognized as a fundamental right under the 14th Amendment, at
least arguably, since the Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
striking down state laws against mixed-race marriages on the ground that the government had
no compelling interest in dictating on the basis of race an individual's choice of marital partner.
51
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Equal Protection Clause renders Proposition 8 unconstitutional under any
standard of review."ss
Distilling the record and arguments presented by Proponents and numerous
amici curiae, Judge Walker determined that the defence of Proposition 8 fell
into six categories of 'purported interests.' These were purported interests
rather than specifically articulated interests because the measure resulted from
a ballot initiative rather than a legislative process in which one could source
particular policy justifications in committee reports or floor debate leading to
passage, and it would be impossible to know the policy interests motivating all
of those who voted to support the measure. Consequently, the official ballot
pamphlet, the official description of the measure, and the advertising campaign
carried on by the Proponents, together with the contentions of their expert
witnesses, served as the source of 'purported interests' that Proposition 8 was
'intended' to effectuate.
The first purported interest was to reserve marriage as a union between a man
and a woman, excluding any other relationship. Walker saw this as a resort to
tradition, preserving an institution for the sake of preserving it without
providing a reason why the state should want to do that. "Tradition alone," he
insisted, "cannot form a rational basis for a law... Rather, the state must have
an interest apart from the fact of the tradition itself." 54 Indeed, if tradition by
itself could constitute a rational basis for maintaining a discriminatory law, the
Supreme Court could not have overturned laws against miscegenation or
sodomy, which were of long standing at the time that Loving and Lawrence v.
Texas were decided. And, Walker found, the Proponents had not shown that
the state had an interest apart from tradition in treating same-sex couples as
inferior to different-sex couples, which denying them the right to marry would
do.
The second purported interest was proceeding with caution when
implementing social changes. The argument went that sudden changes in a
'bedrock social institution' such as marriage could be harmful to society, so the
state could proceed incrementally, as California was doing prior to the decision
in In re Marriage Cases by enacting domestic partnership and gradually
increasing the rights associated with it. Judge Walker was unconvinced, finding
that there was no evidence in the record that allowing same-sex couples to
marry would have "any negative effects on society or on the institution of
marriage," and that the rights of those opposed to homosexuality or same-sex
couples "will remain unaffected if the state ceases to enforce Proposition 8.,"s
Judge Walker's decision was undoubtedly bolstered by the experience of other
states, especially Massachusetts, where same-sex marriage became available in
2004, six years earlier, with no discernable ill effects on that state.

ss 704 F.Supp.2d, at 906-907.
54

Ibid., at 998.

5S Ibid.,

at 999.
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The third purported interest was promoting opposite-sex parenting over samesex parenting. Judge Walker rejected this as a rational basis for prohibiting
same-sex marriages, because the trial record showed that "same-sex parents
and opposite-sex parents are of equal quality" and that there was no evidence
that enforcement of Proposition 8 made it "more likely that opposite-sex
couples will marry and raise offspring biologically related to both parents."5 6
Indeed, it would be hard to argue in 2010 that California had an interest in
favouring different-sex couples over same-sex couples as parents, since
California law had evolved through judicial decisions and the courts to treat
same-sex couples as equal to different-sex couples in much of the law
concerning child custody, visitation, and parental responsibility.
The fourth purported interest was protecting the freedom of those who
opposed same-sex marriage. As to this, one of the main themes of Proponents'
advertising during the initiative campaign was that allowing same-sex marriage
would threaten the ability of parents to shield their children from exposure to
the concepts of same-sex marriage and homosexuality, because these topics
would necessarily become part of the family life curriculum in the public
schools. Judge Walker dismissed this concern by reference to existing California
law predating Proposition 8, and found irrational the argument that the state
could find a legitimate reason to deny marriage to one group based merely on
the opposition of another group.
The Proponents also asserted a state interest in treating same-sex couples
differently from different sex couples by using a different name to identify their
relationships, which would maintain the flexibility to treat different types of
relationships differently and ensure that California marriages were recognized
by other jurisdictions and would conform to federal law. Judge Walker found
that the record supported a conclusion that in all relevant respects for legal
policy purposes, same-sex and different-sex marriages were "exactly the
same," and asserted that claimed differences relied on moral and religious
views. To the extent that this was an argument about the administrative
burdens of issuing and recognizing marriage licenses, Walker found that the
earlier regime of separate institutions of marriage and domestic partnership
were, if anything, more administratively burdensome.
Although Proponents had advanced a catch-all argument seeking to sweep in
any grounds that had been argued by the parties, amici, or the court at any
point in the proceedings, Walker found that the first five categories discussed
above exhausted the argument, and that Proponents had not identified any
other plausible rational bases for sustaining Proposition 8. After a lengthy trial,
culminating in extended, detailed fact findings in his opinion, Walker
concluded, "The resulting evidence shows that Proposition 8 simply conflicts
with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5s

s6 Ibid., at 999-1000.
s7 Ibid., at 1001-2.
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Finally, Judge Walker opined that in the absence of any rational justification for
denying same-sex couples the right to marry, the only remaining motivation
must be "an inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, that
Proposition 8 was premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply are not
as good as opposite-sex couples." Whether this was based on moral
disapproval of homosexuality, animus against gays, or some unproven belief
that different-sex couples were somehow better than same-sex couples, it
could not be the basis for a government policy disadvantaging same-sex
couples, in light of rulings such as Romer and Lawrence that found
unconstitutional state policies or laws that disadvantaged gay people on such
bases. He found the Proponent's arguments to be "post-hoc justifications" that
failed to provide logical support for the measure, and, as such, that what
Proposition 8 really did was to enact a "moral view."
Judge Walker ordered that the enforcement of Proposition 8 be permanently
enjoined, and denied a post-trial application for a stay pending appeal filed by
the Proponents. 59 Governor Schwarzenegger, whose term was soon ending,
and Attorney General Brown (by then an active candidate for Governor),
expressed satisfaction with the decision and no intention to appeal, and
opposed the granting of a stay.
In opposing the application for a stay, the Plaintiffs raised for the first time the
argument that Proponents lacked standing to seek further proceedings in the
case, in light of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on appellate standing,
especially its ruling in the Arizona English Only case.6o Arizona voters approved
a constitutional amendment providing that only English could be spoken in
government offices. A state employee challenged it in federal court, claiming a
violation of her constitutional rights. The District Court declared the law
unconstitutional and the named government defendants decided not to appeal,
but the 9th Circuit allowed the proponents of the initiative to intervene as
appellants. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the original
plaintiff was no longer a state employee and the Court avoided ruling on the
merits by dismissing the appeal as moot and vacating the lower court's opinion.
In the course of its decision, the Court cast substantial doubt on the standing of
the appellants, finding that they had no particularized interest in the outcome
that would confer individual standing, which is necessary because the federal
courts' jurisdiction is limited under Article Ill of the Constitution to "actual cases
and controversies," a requirement that the Supreme Court has construed to
rule out advisory opinions or the consideration of cases in which the plaintiff
has only a theoretical interest. The Court mentioned that the parties had not
presented any authority under Arizona law for finding that initiative
proponents had personal standing to litigate about the constitutional merits of
their initiative. Judge Walker cited this and other Supreme Court cases in his
opinion denying the stay.
ss Ibid., at 1002-3.
s9 702 F.Supp.2d 1132 (N.D.Cal. 2010).
6o

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
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The Proponents then petitioned the 9th Circuit for a stay, joined by the deputy
clerk from Imperial County, who sought to re-enter the case in light of the
failure of the governor and attorney general to appeal. The 9th Circuit's motion
panel granted a temporary stay and set an expedited argument for December
6, 2010, noting that half the argument would be devoted to the question of
petitioners' standing, and half to the merits of the appeal.6 Soon after that
argument was held before a panel of judges constituted to hear the appeal on
the merits, the panel issued an order certifying to the California Supreme Court
the question whether there was any authority under California law for the
Proponents to represent the state's interest on appeal, and dismissing the
62
deputy clerk of Imperial Country from the case. Although ultimately the
question of Article III standing is a matter of federal constitutional law for the
9th Circuit panel to decide, the Supreme Court's dicta in the Arizona case
suggested that a preliminary answer to the state law standing question was
significant, and there was no California Supreme Court precedent directly on
point. The California Supreme Court accepted the certification and set the case
for briefing and argument. Subsequently, the 9th Circuit panel denied a new
motion by the respondents to lift the temporary stay. 63
However the appeal turns out, Judge Walker's decision provides another
milestone. For the first time, a federal judge has ruled that there is no rational
basis for states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry, and so consistent
with the 14th Amendment a state constitutional provision reserving the right to
marry to different-sex couples violates both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. While same-sex marriage proponents had won important
victories under state constitutions in Massachusetts, Iowa, and Connecticut, a
federal constitutional ruling in the Proposition 8 case had the potential to
blossom into a nationwide precedent were it to proceed to the Supreme Court,
as many had assumed it would when the case was filed. The decision by
Governor Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Brown (now Governor Brown)
not to appeal the ruling, and the potential conclusion that the Proponents lack
standing to appeal, may result in leaving Judge Walker's decision intact and
unreviewable, and one could only speculate as to whether that would mean
that Proposition 8, approved by millions of California voters, could be cast aside
on the determination of a single federal judge.6 4
Conclusion
Judge Walker's decision in Perry, issued just weeks after Judge Tauro had
invalidated Section 3 of DOMA using similar reasoning in Gill, suggested that a
corner may have been turned in the unfolding story of LGBT rights in the
federal courts. When the subsequent rulings by Judge Phillips in Log Cabin
Republicans and Judge Leighton in Witt, and the denial of the motion to dismiss
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. 2010).
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011).
6 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL 1034175 (9th Cir. 2011).
64 The 9th Circuit panel noted the difficulties this might present in its order certifying the
standing question under state law to the California Supreme Court, 2010 WL 3212786.
6
62
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in Dragovich by Judge Wilken, are considered in tandem with the other two
rulings, it appears that a consensus may be forming, if not around the
proposition that all sexual orientation discrimination claims should invoke
heightened scrutiny with a presumption that discriminatory policies are
unconstitutional, then at least around the proposition that traditional grounds
for government to disfavour sexual minorities or exclude them from
participation in government programs or access to government benefits on an
equal basis with the presumed sexual majority, are most likely to be rejected,
whether the case involves claimed deprivations of due process or of equal
protection. After Romer and Lawrence, it becomes clear that moralistic
disapproval of homosexuality will no longer be accepted by courts as a
justification for such policies, and that even under the rational basis approach,
courts are increasingly unwilling to indulge hypothetical or "common sense"
arguments based on stereotypical assumptions. That such a consensus seems
to have emerged so soon after the crushing defeat in Bowers v. Hardwick, when
a majority of the Supreme Court was willing to credit moral disapproval as a
rational justification for the application of a felony sodomy law to a consenting
same-sex adult couple, surely marks 2010 as a miraculous year in LGBT law in
the United States. One or two such rulings might be seen as anomalies against
the background of decades of adverse precedent, but rulings from five different
federal trial judges in different districts, followed by a Congressional repeal of
DADT and an administrative renunciation of defending Section 3 of DOMA,
suggest that a decisive turning point has been reached.
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